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must report the results of the offer to the SEC, providing details of the number of
securities subscribed. It may then issue certificates for the new securities.
5. Listing and Registration
Securities permitted under the Act must be registered with the Stock Exchange
of Thailand, which will decide whether the securities should be listed. Under the
Act all previously authorized securities automatically become listed securities with
effect from May 16, 1992. However, all limited companies with listed securities in
issue were required first to become public companies and to comply with the new
listing requirement within two years (five years with specific SEC consent).
The issuing company must maintain a separate register of holders of its securities. The company may itself be the registrar, or it may appoint another registrar
approved by the SEC.
6. Disclosure Requirement
A company that offers securities to the public must subsequently submit financial
and other relevant information to the SEC and promptly inform the SEC of events
that may have a significant effect on the company's business. Directors, managers,
and auditors must disclose their shareholding status and any change therein to the
SEC. The auditors appointed by a public company must be approved by the SEC.

Switzerland*
I. The Legal Capacity and the Capacity to Act of Foreign Companies:
A Welcomed Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal
In a decision dated December 17, 1991,' the Swiss Federal Tribunal had the
opportunity to discuss the principles under which the legal capacity and the capacity to act of foreign companies are to be determined under Swiss law, notably in
light of Switzerland's Federal Code on Private International Law (Federal Code).2
This article describes some of the issues of the case and summarizes the Federal
Tribunal's decisions.
*Prepared by Nicolas Pidrard and Nicolas Killen, members of the law firm Borel Barbey, Geneva,
Switzerland.
1. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1991 (C.V. Inc. v. F.C. Inc.), Swiss Federal Tribunal [ATF] 117 11
494, Semaine Judiciaire [SJ] 1992 at 210.
2. Federal Code on Private International Law of 18 Dec. 1987 (effective as of 1 Jan. 1989),
RS 291 [hereinafter Federal Code].
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THE FACTS

C.V. Inc. (C), a company incorporated under the laws of Panama and having
its seat in Panama, commenced an action against F.C. Inc. (F) and Messieurs A
and B. The complaint, filed before the Geneva courts and dated December 23,
1986, sought payment of SFrs. 152,000 plus interest. According to the complaint,
the monies represented unpaid installments due in the repayment of a participating
loan granted by C to F, further guaranteed jointly and severally by A and B.
By decision dated April 30, 1990, the lower court 3 dismissed the case because
C lacked the capacity to act. The decision was affirmed on appeal on March 22,
1991. The court of appeals held that the Federal Code did not prevent the application of the theory of the effective seat in the case of a fictitious seat. The court
considered that C's statutory seat in Panama did not correspond to C's effective
seat, which in the opinion of the court was located in Switzerland. The court then
established that C was the owner of a foundation in Liechtenstein whose sole
beneficiary was an individual resident in Lebanon. The court ruled that the structure thus violated the Swiss law that prohibits the settlement of property in perpetual trust for the benefit of a family. 4 Since C had its effective seat in Switzerland
and had no capacity under Swiss law, the court ruled that C had no capacity to
act or to commence an action before the Geneva courts.
C filed an appeal before the Federal Tribunal, requesting that its capacity to
act be recognized and that its complaint be declared valid on this ground. F, A
and B's responsive pleadings concurred with the court of appeals' decision.
B.

THE OPINION

1. Historical Background
The Federal Tribunal first stated that several theories existed under the principles of private international law to determine the law applicable to the capacity
of legal entities. The two most important theories are those of effective seat and
place of incorporation. Under the effective seat theory, the capacity of a legal
entity is subject to the laws of the place where the management of the entity is

conducted in fact. The place of incorporation theory subjects the capacity of a
legal entity to the place where the entity was formally created or incorporated.5
Before the enactment of the Federal Code, Swiss law had no specific provision
describing the criteria under which the capacity of legal entities was to be determined. As a result the Federal Tribunal stated that the jurisprudence had resolved
the issue. In a 1950 decision, 6 the Federal Tribunal indeed confirmed that the
3. Judgment of Apr. 30, 1990, Tribunal de Premiere Instance du canton de Gen~ve.
4. CIVIL CODE art. 335 al.2 (Switz.), RS 210.

5. ATF 108 II 400, SJ 1983 at 340; FOSTMOSER, SCHWEIZERISCHES AKTIENRECHT, I/I, at
114; Vischer, Droit international privd, in 1 TRAIT9 DE DROIT PIUV9 SUISSE 4, at 65; Perrin, La
reconnaissance des soci6ts 6trang~res et ses effets 45 (unpublished thesis, Geneva, 1969).
6. Judgment of May 9, 1950 (Vernet v. Tribunal cantonal vaudois et Soccom S.A.) ATF 76 I
150, Journal des Tribunaux [JdT] 1951, at 601.
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determinant factor was the statutory seat of the entity, except where such seat was
fictitious, that is, without any connection with reality and chosen merely to escape
the laws of the country where the entity was actively conducting its business (fraus
legis). In such cases the determinant factor was the place where the entity had its
effective seat, that is, the principal center of its administration. 7 Exceptions based
on the ground of fictitious seat and fraud were confirmed on several occasions
thereafter.8
However, in recent cases the Federal Tribunal did not adopt one theory over
the other. Indeed, the cases submitted to the court did not show a clear separation
between the effective seat and the statutory seat of the entities. 9 The Federal
Tribunal then restated that its jurisprudence had been approved by certain scholars,' but had also been disapproved by others, particularly in the context of
sanctioning an alleged fraud to the law. 1
2. The Federal Code on Private InternationalLaw 2
The new statute clearly codified the theory of incorporation. Article 154 al. 1
of the Federal Code states that companies shall be governed by the law of the
state in which they are organized if they satisfy the publication or registration
requirements of that law. If, however, no such requirements exist, companies
will still be governed by the law of the state in which they are organized if they
are organized according to the law of that state. A company failing to meet these
conditions shall be governed by the law of the state in which it is managed in
fact. 13 The law applicable to the company shall govern, in particular, the legal
capacity and the capacity to act of the company.14
Thus, the Federal Tribunal decided unequivocally that a company was governed
by the law of the country in which it had been incorporated. Only if the company
failed to meet the tests set forth in article 154 al. 1 could it be governed under the
law of the country in which it is managed in fact. An analysis of the provisions
7. Id.
8. ATF 108 11 125ff; ATF 105 III 111, SJ 1980, at 358; ATF 102 Ia 410, SJ 1977, at 81.
9. ATF 110 Ib 217; ATF 108 11402, SJ 1983, at 340.
10. In particular Perrin, Note concernant L'arr~t Earl Orient Shipping, SJ 1987, at 615ff.
11. See Vischer, Praxis des Bundesgerichtes zum internationalenObligationenrecht1982/83,
ASDI 1984, XL, at 341; Heini, Zu einem Urteil des Schweizerishen BundesgerichtesaiberdasPersonalstatus ausl ndisherjuristischerPersonen, IPRax, 1984, cahier n.3, at 166.
12. Federal Code, supra note 2.
13. Id. art. 154 al.2.
14. Id. art. 155 states that:
Except as set forth in Articles 156 to 161, the law applicable to the company shall govern in particular:
a. The legal nature of the company
b. The formation and dissolution
c. The legal capacity and the capacity to act
d. The name or the style
e. The organization
f. The internal relationships, in particular the relationship between the company and its members
g. The liability arising from the violation of company law
h. The liability for the debts of the company
i. The power to represent the company by the persons acting for it pursuant to its organization.
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of the Federal Code brought the court to conclude that the theory of fictitious seat

and fraud, as developed in case law, had not been introduced in the statute by the
legislature. The question then became whether such absence was intended or
whether the theory had been inadvertently left out of the statute. Indeed, the

Federal Code provides for certain exceptions to the rule. 15

The court first analyzed the exceptions likely to apply in the context of the case.
Among the specific provisions relating to company law, 16 article 159 provides
that if the business of a company formed under foreign law is conducted in or

from Switzerland, the liability of the persons acting on behalf of the company
shall be governed by Swiss law. The court emphasized that the issue of the liability
of the persons acting on behalf of the company was certainly distinct from the law

applicable to the company as such. Furthermore, an extensive review of the
legislative history of the statute did not bring the court to the conclusion that the

theory of fraud had not been clearly introduced in the statute inadvertently. To
the contrary, the court concluded that it was the intention of the legislature to opt
for the theory of incorporation and provide for a limited number of specific

exceptions in cases where it considered this to be necessary. Consequently, the
noninclusion of the theory of fraud in the new statute was a deliberate option of
the legislature. Therefore, the court was not empowered to reintroduce the concept
through jurisprudence.
Lastly, the court stated that the provisions relating to company law were also
subject to the general restrictions set forth in the first chapter of the Federal
Code.17 The court analyzed the relevant articles and reached the conclusion that

none of these restrictions were applicable in this context.
15. Id. art. 156: "Claims arising from the public issuance of equity and debt instruments by
means of a prospectus, circular or similar publications shall be governed by the law applicable to the
company or that of the State in which the issuance is made."
Id. art. 157:
The protection against infringement in Switzerland of the name or the style of a company registered in the Swiss
Register of Commerce shall be governed by Swiss law.
In the absence of registration in the Swiss Register of Commerce, the protection of the name or the style shall
be governed by the law applicable to unfair competition (art. 136) or to infringement of personal rights (arts. 132,
133 and 139).

Id. art. 158: "A company may not invoke restrictions on the representative power of a director,
officer or agent which is unknown under the law of the place of business or habitual residence of the
other party unless the other party knew or should have known of the restrictions."
Id. art. 159: "If the business of a company formed under foreign law is conducted in or from Switzerland, the liability of the persons acting on behalf of the company shall be governed by Swiss law."
16. The provisions relating to company law are found in ch. 10 of the Federal Code.
17. Id. The general restrictions are found in ch. 1, § 3 of the Federal Code. The following articles
were considered by the Federal Tribunal: Art. 15:
The law designated by this Code shall not be applied in those exceptional situations where, in light of all the
circumstances, it is manifest that the case has only a very limited connection with that law and has a much closer
connection with another law.
This article is not applicable in the case of a choice of law by the parties.

Art. 17: "The application of provisions of foreign law shall be precluded if it would produce a
result which is incompatible with Swiss public policy."
Art. 18: "This Code is subject to those mandatory provisions of Swiss law which, by reason of
their particular purpose, are applicable regardless of the law designated by this Code."
SUMMER 1993

558

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

3. Conclusion
Pursuant to the findings of the court of appeals the claimant was a Panamanian
company. According to the Federal Tribunal, one must therefore conclude that
the company was created in conformity with the laws of Panama. Nothing proved
that the company would not have been formed in conformity with the law of
Panama. Thus, the exception to the principle set forth in article 154 al.2 of the
Federal Code was not applicable in this case. Pursuant to article 154 al. 1 of the
Federal Code, the claimant was governed by the law of Panama and was granted
legal capacity as well as the capacity to act under that law.
The Federal Tribunal concluded that the appeal was well founded. The case
was remanded to the Geneva court of appeals for a new proceeding to be conducted
in conformity with the Federal Tribunal's decision.
II. Arbitral Tribunals Seated in
Switzerland May Apply EC Law
On April 28, 1992, the Federal Tribunal rendered a decision of great interest
for lawyers dealing with international arbitration. For the first time since the
adoption of the new Swiss provisions on international arbitration in January 1989,
an arbitral award has been set aside by the Federal Tribunal. Additionally, this
decision relates to the application of European Community (EC) law, which is
quite unusual for a country that is not a member of the EC.

A.

THE FACTS

Company X, a Belgian company, and Company Y, a Spanish company, entered
into an agreement called "Specialization and Participation Contract." Pursuant
to this agreement, the companies undertook to collaborate and share their expertise
and activities to enable each other to reach a certain leadership in their respective
markets. For this purpose, X and Yagreed to create various jointly owned companies managed by X or by Y and to mutually supply each other with raw materials
to reduce their production costs. The agreement was governed by Belgian law
and was notified to the European Commission. 8
A dispute arose between the parties regarding the management of one of the
European jointly incorporated companies managed by Y. Consequently, X initiated an ad hoc arbitration procedure in Switzerland in accordance with the arbitration clause provided by the agreement.
For its defense, Y claimed that the arbitral tribunal should either suspend the
arbitration proceedings if the European Commission had not yet decided the
validity of the agreement or review whether the agreement was contrary to article
18. The notification is filed with the European Commission in order possibly to qualify for an
individual exemption under art. 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome for the prohibition contained in art. 85(1)
and protects the parties against fines.
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85 of the Treaty of Rome. This article prohibits all agreements between undertakings and concerted practices that may affect trade between Member States and that
prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the Common Market. According to
Y, resolving this issue was essential. Otherwise, the arbitrators would have been
enforcing an agreement that was illegal and void.
In its final award the arbitral tribunal declared its lack of jurisdiction to decide
this question and stated that, considering the absence of any decision adopted by
the Commission, the presumption was that the agreement was valid under EC
law. Y filed an appeal against the award, which was subsequently set aside by the
Federal Tribunal on the grounds outlined below.
B.

THE FEDERAL TRIBUNAL'S DECISION

Preliminarily, under article 190(2) of the Federal Code, proceedings before the
Federal Tribunal for setting aside arbitral awards may only be initiated when:
(1) the sole arbitrator has been incorrectly appointed or the arbitral tribunal
has been incorrectly constituted;
(2) the arbitral tribunal has wrongly declared itself to have or not to have
jurisdiction;
(3) the award has gone beyond the claims submitted to the arbitral tribunal or
the award failed to decide one of the claims;
(4) the principle of equal treatment of the parties or their right to be heard in
adversarial procedure has not been observed; or
(5) the award is incompatible with public policy.
As the arbitration agreement provided that the award was final, the Federal Tribunal had to decide first whether an appeal was still receivable. Following previous
decisions, 19 the Federal Tribunal held that the waiver of the rights of appeal must
be clear and explicit either by an express statement in the arbitration agreement or
by a subsequent agreement in writing. 20 The only indication that the award would
be final or effective was consequently not sufficient to be interpreted as a waiver.
The most interesting developments of the Federal Tribunal decision relate to
the arbitral tribunal's competence to review the validity of the agreement under
EC law. The Federal Tribunal first outlined the opinions of distinguished authors
who believed that national or arbitral jurisdictions are competent to declare the
invalidity of an agreement violating article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, even in the
presence of formal investigative proceedings by the Commission for the breach
of this provision. 2
19. See Judgment of Dec. 19, 1990 (S.S. v. K. Ltd), ATF 1990 II 640.
20. Federal Code, supra note 2, art. 192(1).
21. See Stoufflet & Chaput, Pratiques restrictives de concurrence, in 3 TRAITA DE DROIT EuROP9EN (Collection des Juris-Classeurs); Koch, in GRABITZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG;
DOMINIQUE HAHN, L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE FACE Aux RtGLES DE LA CONCURRENCE DE LA CEE 50-51, 134 (1983); Goffin, L"artibrage et le droit europden, in REVUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPAR9, tome LXVII, ch. 12, at 227 (1990).
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